For purchases and sales of derivatives (i.e., financial instruments whose value is derived from the value of an underlying asset, interest rate or index) the Advisor evaluates counterparties on the following factors: reputation and financial strength; execution prices; commission costs; ability to handle complex orders; ability to give prompt and full execution, including the ability to handle difficult trades; accuracy of reports and confirmations provided; reliability, type and quality of research provided; financing costs and other associated costs related to the transaction; and whether the total cost or proceeds in each transaction is the most favorable under the circumstances.
Nelson Peltz of Trian Fund Management waged a proxy fight to get himself on the board of Procter & Gamble Co. that ended at P&G's annual meeting in October, when Peltz lost out to management nominee Ernesto Zedillo by about 6.2 million votes. Or did he? In November, an independent recount of the votes found that Peltz had beaten Zedillo by 42,780 votes, or about 0.0016 percent of the shares outstanding. Or did he? On Friday the final official count of the votes came in, finding that Zedillo actually won by 498,312 votes, or about 0.019 percent of the shares outstanding. It is a little disappointing that Zedillo's margin in the third count, though less than his margin in the first count, was bigger than Peltz's margin in the second. I was hoping that not only would the victor alternate with each count, but also that the margin would get narrower and narrower, until eventually we'd find out that the two sides were exactly tied except for a single ballot for a single share written in a special ink that says "Peltz" under fluorescent light and "Zedillo" under natural light. I was hoping that P&G would count the votes again and again forever.

Elsewhere, here is the story of, which "has raised about $700 million and counting" by selling EOS tokens that it says "do not have any rights, uses, purpose, attributes, functionalities or features." is using the money to build "a new blockchain architecture designed to enable vertical and horizontal scaling of decentralized applications," as its white paper explains, and the white paper also includes a disclaimer in bold capitals:
Slippage is when the actual price we execute at is different from what we expect. In this case, a perfect market would let us sell the bitcoin and settle the future at precisely the same time and price. But in practice, market imperfections and Bitcoin volatility could lead to the price moving between the two trades, wiping out profits or putting you in the red.
There are two USA regulated Bitcoin futures exchanges in operation. The CME’s contract unit is five Bitcoins whereas the Cboe’s contract unit is one—that’s the biggest difference between these futures. The upfront money to buy or sell short a CME contract will be about five times higher than the Cboe contract. Larger investors won’t care but this will be an issue for smaller investors. Another difference is the spot/settlement process that the exchanges use. In the case of Cboe futures, the contracts will be settled to a 4 pm ET Gemini exchange auction price on the day of expiration, for the CME futures the settlement price is a complex calculation using an hour of volume weighted data from multiple exchanges (currently Bitstamp, itBit, Kraken, and GDAX). With the CME’s approach, it will be harder to manipulate the settlement price but it doesn’t give arbitrageurs a physical mechanism to trade their positions—possibly an issue.
Since you bought 68.4246 BTC, you want to short 68 BTC and lock in the USD value. You will have 0.4246 BTC left over, which will give you a slightly long bias. You can either fix this by only buying 68 BTC in step 1 or by giving yourself more short exposure by shorting 69 BTC. Remember that CryptoFacilities contracts are inverse (which allow locking in USD) and are denominated in BTC